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European leaders have let their own hubris dominate
their response to the Greek crisis. A total bailout of
Greece would only cost the European Union 2 per cent
of its GDP.
Mar 21 2012
The European leaders who established the Euro were guilty of political hubris,
which blinded their vision of the common good. Jon Danielsson argues that their
successors are repeating the same mistake of ‘hubrisk’ in trying to resolve the
sovereign debt crisis.
What makes the European sovereign debt crisis so intractable is that it is not just
another crisis. It is two crises in one. A sovereign debt crisis and a policy response
crisis. Of the two the latter is doing the damage. The underlying direct causes are
well known: the political desire for strong ties between European countries acting as the driving
force of the European common market and the monetary union. History tells us that the success of
such unions hinges critically on several factors, most importantly a common fiscal policy.
In the absence of these conditions, a monetary union is set to fail. The Maastricht criteria was
devised by European leaders to avoid failure, but they then wasted no time in ignoring their own
design. By ignoring the necessary conditions, the European leaders who created the euro were
guilty of hubris. Their decisions were not rooted in a pragmatic determination for a common good
but rather in their own personal political ability to implement a monetary union. This moment of
weakness is now the biggest threat to European integration.
This problem was compounded by the prevailing view that sovereign risk had somehow been
eliminated — a view encouraged by European banking regulations stipulating that sovereign debt is
risk free. This both acts as a tax on other creditors and also sends a powerful signal. Interestingly,
Greek debt is still considered risk free by the regulators.
The European policy makers have consistently misread the nature of the Greek crisis, letting hubris
dominate their crisis response. Many countries have faced similar difficulties as Greece, and the
EU leaders could have consulted those with first hand knowledge of sovereign crisis management.
Instead they repeated mistakes made elsewhere.  The leaders do recognise the common fiscal
policy problem, and have contingency plans for a Greek exit from the euro. What they have not done
is learning from other sovereign debt crises, and instead let politics get in the way of minimising the
economic damage to Europe.
This continues. Now the European policy makers believe that Greece can manage with debt to
GDP of 120 per cent, which is the level Italy manages with difficulty. Other crises would tell them this
is wishful thinking. The Greek debt tolerance is closes to the Argentinian level of 40 per cent and the
extreme austerity is not going to make that better.
The crisis resolution process shows the same familiar
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The crisis resolution process shows the same familiar
signs of further hubris risk. The direct financial cost of
a Greek default is quite trivial in the European context.
Total Greek debt is around €350 billion, but the EU
GDP is €15 trillion, so a total bailout of Greece would
only cost the EU around 2.3 per cent of its GDP. The
cost of not solving the problem is an order of
magnitude higher, estimated by myself and my
colleague to be 22 per cent of European GDP.Greece
will end up costing its creditors most of the €350
billion. Better to come to that realisation now, and let
both the Greeks and the European economy get on
with rebuilding. Extreme austerity and parcelling out
bailouts will only make it worse.
It is hard to see the objective of the European
authorities. Perhaps they want to make sure that
anybody receiving bailouts will have to suffer so much
that nobody else will be tempted to get into the same
situation. Or perhaps they want to use this as a means
to create a proper European central government — a
transfer union. Regardless of the motivation, the costs
not only to Europe but also to the world are too high.
By letting political desire triumph over economic
reality, the EU authorities are yet again guilty of
hubrisk, the risk of hubris.
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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European
Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. 
____________________________________
About the author
Jon Danielsson – LSE Department of Finance
Jon Danielsson is a reader in finance at the LSE. His research interests include
financial risk modelling, regulation of financial markets, models of extreme market
movements, market liquidity, and financial crisis. He has published extensively in
both academic and practitioner journals, and has presented his work in a number of
universities, public institutions, and private firms.
Related posts:
1. Brussels blog round up for 10-16 March 2012: Concern over the Ukraine, Sarkozy gets tough
on Schengen, and how big is Greece’s bailout?
2. With no political union in Europe, the Euro crisis may be a ‘never ending game’ for deep-
rooted economic reasons
3. The Euro was locked into its current crisis twenty years ago by the Maastricht negotiators,
who ceded authority to the financial markets
This entry was posted in Jon Danielsson, The Euro, European economics, finance, business and
regulation and tagged crisis, Euro, Euro crisis, financial regulation, Greece, hubris, Maastricht
Treaty, risk. Bookmark the permalink.
